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FORMALISM IN THE FoRuM?
UNITED STATES V. KOKINDA AND THE ExTENsION OF
THE PUBLIC FORUM DocmNE
Ignoring cries of formalism, Justice O'Connor led the plurality in
United States v. Kokinda I in further refining the public forum doctrine.2
The plurality held that government property's location and purpose,
rather than its mere physical characteristics, dictate whether such prop-
erty constitutes a traditional public forum.' The Court thus determined
that a sidewalk 4 leading to a post office was not a traditional public fo-
rum and therefore not available for public discourse.5
The first amendment's6 protection of freedom of speech is not abso-
lute.7 Courts do not hesitate to uphold a multitude of restrictions on
1. 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
2. The phrase "public forum" is generally attributed to Professor Harry Kalven's 1965 article,
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 1 [hereinafter Kalven]. See
also Post, Between Government and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1713, 1718 (1987) (citing Kalven); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 4.09[D], at 4-69 n. 163 (2d
ed. 1984); and Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20,
35 (1975)). For Kalven, the public forum doctrine was not a means of categorizing government
property. "[H]is central concern was rather with the protection of 'uninhibited, robust and wide-
open' speech 'on public issues'..." Post, supra, at 1718-19 (citing Kalven, supra, at 3). Kalven
believed:
[I]n an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public places are an im-
portant facility for public discussion and political process. They are in brief a public forum
that the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such facilities are
made available is an index of freedom.
Kalven, supra, at 11-12.
The Supreme Court adopted the phrase "public forum" in Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92 (1972), explicitly acknowledging its debt to Kalven. 408 U.S. at 95 n.3, 99 n.6.
3. 110 S. Ct. at 3120-21.
4. For a discussion of the particular characteristics of the sidewalk at issue, see infra note 44.
5. A "traditional public forum" is one of three classifications into which all government prop-
erty must fall. In addition to traditional public forums, publicly owned property may also be a
"'designated public forum" or a "nonpublic forum." See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text
for the distinguishing features of each category.
6. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition to Government for a redress of griev-
ances." U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
7. "No one, with the possible exception of Justice Douglas in his last years, believed that all
speech was absolutely protected." Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analy-
sis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1227 (1984) (cit-
ing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 356 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult
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content,' as well as the time, place, and manner of speech. 9 Further-
more, for nearly a century, the Supreme Court has struggled to deter-
mine the extent to which government may restrict the freedom of speech
on government-owned property.' 0
The Court first addressed the question of a citizen's right to use gov-
ernment property for expressive activities in the 1897 case Davis v. Mas-
sachusetts." The Court held that the government, like the private
citizen,'2 was not obliged to make available its property for open discus-
sion.1a Forty-two years later, in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Or-
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
8. For example "unprotected speech" may be regulated based on its content. See generally
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). "Unprotected speech" falls into recognized
categories of harmful speech to which the Court awards little or no first amendment protection. G.
STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1058 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter G. STONE]. Unprotected speech includes obscenity, fraudulent misrepresentation, defamation,
fighting words, etc. Id. at 1114-15, 1104-05, 1059-80 and 1009-17.
In addition, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806-07
(1985) held that the government may restrict speech in nonpublic and limited designated forums
based on the content of the speech but not on the viewpoint of the speaker. Cornelius allows the
government to prohibit topics not encompassed within the designated forum. However, if the topic
is appropriate the government may prohibit discussion based solely on the speaker's opinion on that
topic. Id. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
9. For example, a city ordinance may properly require a permit to hold a parade on a city
street. See, eg., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), discussed infra at note 15.
10. The exercise of first amendment rights on private property is beyond the scope of this Note.
For a discussion of this subject see G. STONE, supra note 8, at 1198-1201. See also L. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 998-1009 (1988).
11. 167 U.S. 43 (1897). The Court upheld a preacher's conviction for addressing a crowd in the
Boston Common without a permit. Id. at 46-47.
12. The Court reasoned that the government's right to regulate expression on public land was
co-extensive with the right of a private landowner. Id. at 47.
13. 167 U.S. at 47-48. The Court concluded that the defendant had no first amendment right to
use the Boston Common without consent. Id.
Commentators generally have been critical of Davis. Post attacks the reasoning in Davis as rest-
ing on a "syllogism." Post, supra note 2, at 1722.
The major premise of the argument is that when the government acts in a proprietary
capacity, like "the owner of a private house," it can abridge or prohibit speech. The minor
premise of the argument is that the government in fact acted in a proprietary capacity with
respect to the Boston Common....
The Court in Davis defended the minor premise of this syllogism on the basis of state
property law. It defended the major premise on the basis of what today would be called the
"rights-privilege" distinction. The Court reasoned that, because Boston "owned" the
Common and could therefore "absolutely exclude all right to use," it necessarily also re-
tained the power "to determine under what circumstances such use may be availed," in-
cluding circumstances abridging speech, since the "greater power contains the lesser."
Post, supra note 2, at 1722-23 (footnotes omitted).
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ganization, the Court retreated from Davis's broad holding. Justice
Roberts asserted that streets and parks immemorially have been held in
trust for public use and for "time out of mind" have been utilized for
assembly and speech.15 Occasionally in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court
departed completely from a forum analysis in favor of a single test that
focused on the compatibility of the expressive activity with the normal
activity of the relevant place.1 6 Later cases, however, reaffirmed that not
14. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, the Court examined a municipal ordinance prohibiting
meetings in the street and other public places without a permit. Id. at 501-03.
15. Id. at 515-16. Writing for the plurality, Justice Roberts regarded the use of such places as a
right of citizenship that, although not absolute, could not be abridged or denied totally. Id. This
statement became the cornerstone of the "public forum doctrine." See, eg., Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See also supra note 2 for a discussion of the
term "public forum."
In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), decided shortly after Hague, the Court struck down
three municipal ordinances that established an absolute ban on the distribution of leaflets. Id. at
162-65. Although the government contended that the ban was necessary to prevent littering, the
Court held such inconveniences insufficient to justify a flat denial of a fundamental right. Id. at 162.
The Court further noted that the State's objective could be met by means less burdensome on the
freedom of expression. Id.
While Schneider prohibited absolute denials of speech in traditional public forums, the Court has
upheld less restrictive regulations. In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), the Court per-
mitted an ordinance requiring a permit for parades and processions on a public street. Id. at 570-71.
The Court held the ordinance permissible but limited the time, place, and manner of speech. Id. at
576. The Court noted that the maintenance of public order and efficient use of the street was an
essential prerequisite to the enjoyment of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. Id. at 574.
16. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). In Grayned, the Court upheld an ordi-
nance prohibiting a person from willfully making noise on grounds adjacent to a school if the noise
disturbed the school's peace or good order. Id. at 107-08. The Court recognized that exposure of
the students to the "robust exchange of ideas" was an important function of the school, but noted
that expressive activity permissibly could be restricted to forbid material disruption of the educa-
tional process. Id. at 117-18 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13
(1969)). In Tinker the Court held that the school district could not punish students for wearing
black arm bands in protest of the Vietnam War. 393 U.S. at 512-14. The Grayned Court stated that
the determinative inquiry was whether the manner of expression was "basically incompatible" with
the normal activity of a particular place and time. 408 U.S. at 116. This basic incompatibility test
offered an alternative to the public forum analysis, subjecting all government property to a single
test.
See also Post, supra note 2, at 1730. Post suggests that Grayned's test "set forth a regime of
constitutional regulation explicitly designed to serve the first amendment value of maximizing social
communication." Id. at 1731. In this light, Grayned "exemplified the spirit of Kalven's 1965 arti-
cle, which it duly acknowledged. For this reason, Grayned has remained a touchstone case for many
commentators." Id. Thus, in rejecting the categorization of public property, Grayned served the
underlying first amendment values.
Post asserts that the impact of Grayned was undercut by Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972). Mosley, decided the same day as Grayned and similarly authored by Justice Marshall, ex-
pressly adopted Kalven's public forum concept. Post, supra note 2, at 1731-33. Therefore, Grayned
and Mosley, taken together, created confusion as to whether government property should be catego-
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all government property is an appropriate forum for speech. 17
In 1983, Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators'Associa-
tion 1" created a new era of public forum analysis. In Perry, a teachers'
union19 sought access to the teachers' intraschool mailboxes.20 The
Court stated that the right of access to public property depends upon
that property's character.2" The property's character will determine the
proper standard to test the validity of the limitation on speech.22
Perry categorized all government owned property into three groups.23
First, the Court labeled places that are traditionally devoted to assembly
and debate, such as streets and parks, as "quintessential" or traditional
public forums.24 Second, property that the government specifically opens
for public use as places for expressive activity the Court categorized as
"designated public forums. 25 The scope of a designated public forum,
rized for first amendment analysis. Id. Post claims, "Modem public forum doctrine developed
from Mosley, not Grayned." Id. at 1733.
17. See, eg., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding the conviction of 32 students
arrested for trespassing during a demonstration on jailhouse grounds). Some commentators point to
Adderley as the key case "resurrecting" the logic of Davis. See, eg., Post, supra note 2, at 1725-29;
Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 109, 115-17 (1986).
See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding a regulation prohibiting political
speeches and leafletting on the federal military reservation Fort Dix); United Postal Serv. v. Council
of Greenburgh Civic Assocs., 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (holding residential mailboxes were not public
forums and as such could not be used to distribute leaflets without the proper postage). These cases
held that public ownership or control of property did not guarantee access for first amendment
activities, thus enabling the government to preserve its property for its lawfully dedication purpose.
See, e.g., Council of Greenburgh Civic Assocs., 453 U.S. at 129-30 (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828 (1976) and Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)).
18. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
19. Prior to the election that selected Perry Education Association as the exclusive union, both
competing unions had access to the intraschool mail system and the teachers' in school mailboxes.
After the election, Perry Education Association became the only union allowed access to the mail
system or mailboxes. Id. at 38-41.
20. Id. at 41. See supra note 19.
21. Id. at44.
22. Id. at 44.
23. 460 U.S. at 45-46.
24. Id. at 45 (citing Hague v. Committee for Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). See supra
notes 14-15 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Hague. In Perry, the parties conceded
that the school mail system and mailboxes were not traditional public forums. Id. at 46-47. The
court approved language of the court of appeals holding the forums at issue not traditionally public,
"We do not hold that a school's internal mail system is a public forum in the sense that a school
board may not close it to all but official business if it chooses." Id. at 46 (quoting Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1301 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 36 (1983)).
25. 460 U.S. at 45-46.
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however, may be limited.26  Finally, public property closed to public
communication were nonpublic forums.27
Perry's categorization of forums is significant because it determines the
Court's standard of review for restrictions. The government must show a
compelling interest to enforce "content-based" regulations for traditional
and designated public forums. 28  Furthermore, it must show that its reg-
ulations are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.29 As long as the
restrictions leave open channels of communication, the government may
impose "content-neutral" time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest.30
A different standard governs nonpublic forums. The government may
restrict expression if the regulation is reasonable3 and not an effort to
suppress an opposed view.32
In defining the parameters of a designated public forum, 33 Perry noted
that the government's opening of its property for unrestricted use by the
26. 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. The Court recognized that a forum may be created to serve particular
groups such as in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (student groups allowed to use otherwise
unoccupied meeting facilities), or for the discussion of particular subjects. City of Madison Joint
School District v. Wisconsin Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (scope of
discussion at a school board meeting). Id. The Court implicitly indicated that the forum could be
limited in the manner of expression allowed by citing to Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546 (1975) (a municipal theater could be opened for theatrical presentations). Id. at 45-46.
The Constitution forbids exclusion from a forum generally open to the public, even if the govern-
ment was not required to create the forum in the first place. Id. at 45. "Although a state is not
required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by
the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum." Id. at 46.
The designated public forum category apparently encompassed what had been referred to as "lim-
ited public forums" in earlier cases. See, eg., Hefferon v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
27. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Notable examples of public property regarded as nonpublic forums
include those addressed in Adderley (a county jailhouse), Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) and
United Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981). See supra note
17 and accompanying text.
28. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
29. d. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
30. Id. (citing Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 132; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
31. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
32. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. at 131 n.7).
Perry later asserts that "when government property is not dedicated to open communication the
government may-without further justification-restrict use to those who participate in the forum's
official business." Id. at 53 (footnote omitted).
33. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
962 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
general public arguably creates a public forum.34 However, the Court
held mere selective access insufficient to create such a forum 35  More-
over, the constitutional right of access to a public forum designated for
particular groups' limited purposes only extends to other entities of simi-
lar character.36
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. ,37
the Court further refined the public forum doctrine in three significant
respects. First, the Court adopted a forum analysis as a means of deter-
mining when the government's interest in limiting the use of public prop-
erty outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for
expressive activities.3"
Second, Cornelius held that the government creates a designated pub-
lic forum only by intentionally opening a non-traditional public forum
for expressive activities. 39 The government's policy and practice regard-
ing the forum, the property's nature, and its compatibility with expres-
sive activities are determinative of the government's intent.'
Finally, the Court clarified the "reasonableness test" applicable to
nonpublic forums. The Court held that the reasonableness of a restric-
tion on speech must be assessed in light of the forum's purpose and all
surrounding circumstances. 41 The regulation need not be the most rea-
sonable or the only reasonable limitation, but merely reasonable.42
In United States v. Kokinda,43 the Court determined that a sidewalk
34. Id. at 47.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 48. The court stated that even if the school district created a "limited" public forum
by granting access to the Cub Scouts, YMCAs, and parochial schools, the forum would be open only
"for use by the Girl Scouts, the local boys' club, and other organizations that engage in activities of
interest and educational relevance to students. They would not as a consequence be open to an
organization such as the PLEA, which is concerned with the terms and conditions of teacher em-
ployment." Id.
37. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
38. Id. at 800.
39. Id. at 802. "The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse,"
Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46).
40. Id. The Court further stated that it "will not find that a public forum has been created in
the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, nor will we infer that the government intended to
create a public forum when the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity." Id.
at 804 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977)),
41. Id. at 809.
42. Id. at 808.
43. 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
[Vol. 69:957
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leading to the entrance of a post office was neither a traditional public
forum nor expressly designated for the type of speech in question.'
Therefore, the sidewalk constituted a nonpublic forum,45 thus implicat-
ing the "reasonableness test." The Court found that the postal regula-
tion at issue prohibiting solicitation on post office grounds was
reasonable46 and thus constitutional.47
Kokinda further developed the public forum doctrine by addressing
44. Id. at 3121. In Kokinda, postal inspectors arrested Marsha Kokinda and Kevin Pearl for
soliciting contributions for the National Democratic Policy Committee on a sidewalk leading to the
entrance of a post office. Id. at 3117-18. The sidewalk ran adjacent to the post office building, was
completely on post office property, and was distinct from the public sidewalk, which ran parallel to
the highway on which the post office was located. Id. at 3118.
A United States Magistrate in the District of Maryland tried and convicted Kokinda and Pearl.
The court fined Kokinda $50 and sentenced her to ten days in imprisonment and fined Pearl $100
and ordered a thirty day suspended sentence. Id. at 3118. The district court affirmed the convic-
tions, holding the sidewalk in question did not constitute a public forum. Id. A divided panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding the sidewalk was a tradi-
tional public forum and that the restriction failed to pass strict scrutiny. 866 F.2d 699 (4th Cir.
1989), rey'd, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). See supra notes 6, 39-41 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of traditional public forums and the level of scrutiny applied.
45. 110 S. Ct. at 3121.
46. Id. at 3122-25. The plurality rested its decision on the post office's prior experience with
solicitation that proved the endeavor to be "unadministratable." Id. at 3122. It also held that solici-
tation is "inherently disruptive" of the postal service's business of "efficient and effective delivery of
the mail." Id. at 3123.
47. For a nonpublic forum, any reasonable regulation will pass constitutional muster. Id. at
3121-22. The Court cited Cornelius with approval: "The Government's decision to restrict access to
a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable
limitation." Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808) (emphasis in the original). See supra notes 41-42
and accompanying text.
Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality decision joined by Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy be-
lieved the regulation at issue met "the traditional standards applied to time, place, and manner
restrictions of protected expression." Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
Although Justice Kennedy found it unnecessary to reach a conclusion on the public forum ques-
tion, he subtlety criticized the plurality's forum analysis, asserting that a "powerful argument" re-
mains that the postal sidewalk was more than a nonpublic forum. Id. at 3125. Kennedy stated: "If
our public forum jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we must recognize that certain objective charac-
teristics of Government property and its customary use by the public may control the case." Id.
(citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 819-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
The Second Circuit in International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1991) placed great weight on Justice Kennedy's opinion. In resolving the question of
whether the unleased portion of an airport terminal constituted a traditional public forum, the court
noted that other circuits regarded airports as traditional public forums or "public forums" generally.
925 F.2d at 580 (citing Jamison v. City of St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 987 (1988); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs, 785 F.2d 791, 793-95 (9th Cir.
1986), aff'd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 569 (1987); Fernandes v. Linmner, 663 F.2d 619, 626 (5th
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how to determine whether a given government-owned property consti-
tutes a traditional public forum.48 The Court held that "mere physical
characteristics" are not determinative.49 The plurality reasoned that the
postal sidewalk did not have the "characteristics of public sidewalks tra-
ditionally open to expressive activity.")5 0
The Court distinguished the postal sidewalk from a nearby municipal
sidewalk that ran parallel with the road."1 The postal sidewalk led only
from the parking areas to the front door of the post office and was not a
public thoroughfare.5 2 The plurality emphasized that the city con-
structed the postal sidewalk solely to assist patrons in negotiating the
area between the parking lot and the post office's front door and not to
facilitate "the daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or city.""
Thus, Kokinda establishes that the determination of a forum's nature
turns upon its "location and purpose," rather than its physical
Cir. 1981)). However, Lee maintained that the Kokinda decision required the court to re-examine
the issue in a new light. 925 F.2d at 580.
Lee regarded Justice Kennedy's opinion as determinative on the practices engaged in by the plain-
tiff-in-person solicitation and the distribution of literature. The Lee court applied the Kokinda
plurality's analysis and held that airports were not traditional public forums and upheld the ban on
solicitation, as did Justice Kennedy in Kokinda. Id. at 581. However, the court noted that Ken-
nedy's concurrence offered limited support to the plurality's opinion and indicated his willingness to
strike a ban on the distribution of literature. Id. at 582. Noting that the four dissenters in Kokinda
also would have struck a ban on the distribution of literature, Lee observed that "at least a majority,
perhaps more," of the justices would render such a prohibition unconstitutional. Id. Therefore, Lee
struck the airport's prohibition on the distribution of literature but upheld its ban on in-person
solicitation. Id. at 577.
48. Neither Perry nor Cornelius contend the relevant forums were traditionally public. See
supra notes 24, 37-42 and accompanying text. Therefore, O'Connor looked to the rationals of
Grace, Greer, and Council of Greenburgh as supplemented by the holdings of Perry and Cornelius.
See generally 110 S. Ct. at 3119-22. See also supra notes 17, 27 and accompanying text.
49. 110 S. Ct. at 3120 (emphasis added). The plurality reasoned that if the mere physical char-
acteristics of the property controlled, then Greer v. Spoek, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) would have been
decided differently. Id. "In that case, we held that even though a military base permitted free
civilian access to certain unrestricted areas, the base was a nonpublic forum. The presence of side-
walks and streets within the base did not require a finding that it was a public forum." Id. (citing
Greer, 424 U.S. at 835-37).
50. Id. at 3120.
51. Id. For more on the particular sidewalk in question see supra note 44.
52. Id.
53. Id. O'Connor sought to distinguish the postal sidewalk from the public street described in
Heffron, which was "continually open, often uncontested, and constitute[d] not only a necessary
conduit in the daily affairs of a locality's citizens, but also a place where people [could] enjoy the
open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment." Id. (quoting Heffron,
452 U.S. at 651).
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characteristics.54
Justice Brennan, in his final dissent before leaving the Court,55 at-
tacked the public forum doctrine developed in Perry and Cornelius 16 and
criticized the plurality's extension of that doctrine.57 Noting the wide-
spread criticism of the contemporary use of the public forum doctrine,58
Brennan stated that the plurality's present use of the doctrine confirmed
his doubts.59 He maintained that all government-owned sidewalks left
open to the public are public forums per se. ° Departing from the public
forum doctrine,61 Justice Brennan concluded that expressive activity was
compatible with the normal use of even a single-purpose sidewalk.62
Moreover, under prior public forum analysis, sidewalks have been con-
sidered traditional public forums that do not lose their historically recog-
nized character simply because they abut government property.63
Justice Brennan concluded that communication on a postal sidewalk is
permissible under the principle that a person rightfully on a street left
open to the public carries the constitutional right to express her views in
an orderly fashion." He asserted that this obvious conclusion could not
54. Id.
55. See James, Free-Speech Cases Reveal Momentum of Restraint, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990,
at S11, col. 1.
56. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3126-28. For a discussion of Perry and Cornelius, see supra notes
18-42 and accompanying text.
57. Id. at 3128-39.
58. Id. at 3126 n.1 (citing L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 993; Dienes, supra note 26, at 110;
Farber & Nowak, supra note 7, at 1234; Post, supra note 2, at 1715-16; and Stone, Content-neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 46, 93 (1987)).
See also Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7
CARDOZO L. REv. 335, 341 (1986); Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access
to Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. Rnv. 121, 121-22 (1982) noted in Post, supra note 2, at
1715-16 n.7.
59. 110 S. Ct. at 3128.
60. Id. (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)).
61. Brennan relied on the compatibility standard set out in Grayned. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
62. 110 S. Ct. at 3128.
63. Id. (citing Grace, 461 U.S. at 177, 180).
64. Id. (quoting Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943)). Brennan distinguished the case
in which the citizen does not have the legal right to be present from those in which the citizen
..claim[s] a right to enter government property for the particular purpose of speaking." Id. at 3128-
3129 n.2 (quoting Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 48 (1986)). Justice O'Connor raised the issue of
whether such a distinction was viable in her unanimous opinion in Airport Commr's v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987). However, as the regulation in question there was struck down
as overbroad, the Court did not resolve the issue of one's right to be on government property. 482
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be obscured by any "doctrinal pigeonholing, complex formula, or mul-
tipart test." 65
CONCLUSION
Kokinda clarifies the traditional public forum concept by looking be-
yond the physical characteristics to the property's location and pur-
pose. 66 The decision recognizes the government's right to utilize public
property without encroaching upon those places that have "immemori-
ally been held in trust" for speech and debate. Undoubtedly, prior
lower court cases that resolved the forum issue by looking only to the
physical characteristic of the property will require re-evaluation.68
Although the modem public forum doctrine ultimately may rest on a
formalistic principle,69 Kokinda's "logic and purpose" standard rejects a
U.S. at 573. Apparently, Justice O'Connor does not believe such a distinction is significant under
the public forum analysis. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
65. 110 S. Ct. at 3128. In sum, Justice Brennan regards the Court's opinion in Kokinda as "a
farce of the public forum doctrine." Id. at 3139.
However, the plurality's opinion in Kokinda is consistent with the Court's recent public forum
doctrine cases. The plurality's distinction between the sidewalks in Grace and Kokinda turns on the
difference in location and purpose. A decision to the contrary turns the rights of citizens to use
government property on such "architectural idiosyncrasies" as whether the property provides an
entrance preceded by a sidewalk, a staircase, an enclosed walkway, or nothing at all. Holding that a
postal walkway is a traditional public forum because it physically resembles a municipal sidewalk
well enough to be labeled a "sidewalk" is a formalism of its own.
Justice Brennan sought to avoid having architectural idiosyncrasies and labeling dominate the
public forum analysis; but read literally, that is exactly what his argument, in part, achieves, See
supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 14-15, 24-25, 49-55 and accompanying text.
68. See, eg., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1991). In resolving the question of whether the unleased portion of an airport terminal constituted a
traditional public forum, the Second Circuit noted that other circuits addressing the issue regarded
airports as traditional public forums or "public forums" generally. 925 F.2d at 580 (citing Jamison
v. City of St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); Jews for Jesus,
Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs, 785 F.2d 791, 793-95 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 482
U.S. 569 (1987); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1981)). These decisions often
stressed the fact that the physical characteristics of a moderm airport terminal usually resemble a
miniature city or busy city street. However, Lee maintained that Kokinda required the court to re-
examine the airport forum issue in light of that decision. 925 F.2d at 580.
Applying the Kokinda plurality's analysis, Lee held that airports were not traditional public fo-
rums. The court relied on Justice Kennedy's opinion and struck down the airport's prohibition on
the distribution of literature but upheld the ban on in-person solicitation. 925 F.2d at 577. See
supra note 48.
69. The "correctness" of the modem public forum doctrine appears to turn on the appropriate-
ness of the Court's application of common law property notions in the determination of the first
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similarly formalistic alternative that would classify any property which
could be labeled a "sidewalk" as a traditional public forum.7" Instead,
the Court prescribes a test that requires an analysis of whether the prop-
erty may be properly regarded as a place immemorially held in trust for
speech and debate.71 In this respect, Kokinda takes a decisive step away
from formalistic answers to difficult questions and embraces a constitu-
tional analysis befitting the high principles of free speech.
Stephen R. Welby
amendment's scope. If these notions of ownership and the power to exclude rest with the govern-
ment, even in the context of the first amendment, then Kokinda and the precedent on which it rests
are correct. If not, and the public forum analysis is merely a substitute for balancing the govern-
ment's interest against the interests of individual citizens, then the cries of formalism are well-
founded, and the public forum analysis is no more than a complex doctrinal pigeonholing standing
in the place of constitutional analysis. See generally Post, supra note 2, at 1715-64 and Dienes,
supra note 26, at 119-20. See also supra notes 38, 49-66 and accompanying text.
Although critics of the Court's public forum analysis regard the application of common law prop-
erty notions as inappropriate, such notions lie at the heart of Davis, Adderley, Perry, Cornelius,
Kokinda, and their progeny. See generally Post, supra note 2, at 1715-64 and Dienes, supra note 26,
at 119-20. The contention that the Court ignores the balancing of interests in favor of a formalistic
methodology to answer difficult questions of first amendment rights lies at the core of Justice Bren-
nan's dissents in Kokinda and Perry and Justice Blackmun's dissent in Cornelius, with which Justice
Kennedy apparently agrees to some extent. Absent a superseding reason, such as the prop-
erty/rights reasoning, the use of the public forum doctrine to circumvent a consideration of the
impact of the Court's decision rests ultimately on a convenience justification-which by any stan-
dard is wholly unacceptable.
70. See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
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